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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
MARGRET AIKHIONBARE, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
) APPELLANT'S 
) OPENING BRIEF 
• Lower Court No. 961023527 MC 
1 Ct. App. No. 970320-CA 
> Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal by Margret Aikhionbare from the judgment and 
conviction of Assault, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-102 (1997). This Court obtains statutory jurisdiction over this Class B 
Misdemeanor conviction, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953 
& Supp. 1997). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Issues 
1. Whether counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the 
City's use of rebuttal to twice present its case-in-chief. A corollary issue is 
whether the trial court committed plain error in allowing the evidence, even 
though counsel failed to object. 
2. Whether the evidence was insufficient to support 
Aikhionbare's conviction. 
B. Standards of Appellate Review 
1. The ineffectiveness claim presents a question of law and is 
reviewed non-deferentially for correction of error. See State v. Classon, 935 
P.2d 524, 531, 312 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 30-31 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State v. 
Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1238 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
2. (a) Sufficiency of the evidence issue requires Aikhionbare 
to marshal the facts to demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient even 
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when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. See State v. Pilling, 875 
P.2d 604, 607-08 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1225 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993); West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
(b) The plain error analysis requires this Court to view the 
trial record as a whole to determine if the claimed errors seriously affected the 
fairness of the trial. See State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996); State 
v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29, 35 & nn.7-12 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814, 110 
S. Ct. 62 (1989). 
(c) A trial court's factual findings in a bench trial is 
reviewed for clear error. See State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 787 n.2 (Utah 
1988). 
C. Preservation of Issues and Propriety of Review 
The issue relating to failure to object to rebuttal witnesses was not 
preserved in the court below, as trial counsel could not have preserved his own 
ineffectiveness for appellate review. See State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 580 n.3 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). Accordingly, review 
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is proper here, for Aikhionbare is being represented by new counsel and the 
trial record is adequate on the ineffectiveness claim.1 
In the alternative, this Court could apply the plain error doctrine 
to counsel's failure to preserve the foregoing issue. See Utah R. Evid. 103(d); 
Eldredge, 113 P.2d at 35 & nn.7-12; State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
The relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules cited 
below, are reproduced in the following order at Addendum II: 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution; Article I, Section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution; Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102; Salt Lake City Code § 11-08-
020; Utah Rules of Evidence 103(d), 611. 
xSee State v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1, 8 n.19 (Utah 1993); State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); Salt Lake City v. Grotepas, 874 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 
Ct. App.), reversed and remanded on other grds., 906 P.2d 890 (Utah 1995). See 
generally State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991)("ineffectiveness 
of trial counsel should be raised on appeal if the trial record is adequate. . . and 
the defendant is represented by other than trial counsel."); State v. Strain, 885 
P.2d 810, 814 & n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1994)(same). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A» Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the judgment and conviction of Margret 
Aikhionbare ("Margret" or "Aikhionbare") on April 22, 1997, by the 
Honorable Robin W. Reese, judge presiding, in the Third Judicial District 
Court for Salt Lake County, Division II, State of Utah. The court convicted 
Aikhionbare of "Battery," or more appropriately, Willful Use of Unlawful 
Force or Violence Against the Person of Another, a Class B Misdemeanor, in 
violation of Salt Lake City Code § 11-08-020 (1996). See Utah Code 
Annotated § 76-5-102 (1953 & Supp. 1996). See also R.l. 
B* Course of Proceedings 
Aikhionbare waived jury and was tried by the court on March 26 
and April 22, 1997. She was subsequently convicted as charged (R.193). 
C. Disposition in Trial Court 
On April 22, 1997, the court ordered Aikhionbare committed to 
the Salt Lake County Jail for sixty days and fined her in the amount of four 
- 5 -
hundred dollars. The jail sentence was suspended in lieu of a one-year 
probation (R.19; Addendum I). This appeal then followed. 
D. Statement of the Facts 
In the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence reveals the 
following:2 
1. The Fight 
On September 30,1996, appellant Margret and her husband, Victor 
("the Aikhionbares"), went over to the apartment of their friend, Evelyn 
"Okhomina" (R.35).3 Prior to the Aikhionbares' arrival at the apartment, 
Evelyn testified she overheard a telephone conversation in which her 
paramour, Don Okhomina, tell Victor not to come over (R.36-37). Don then 
hung up, relating to Evelyn that that was Victor he had just told not to come 
2See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-96(Utah 1994)(requiring that appellate 
court review verdict evidence in the lightmost favorable to the trial court's 
dtermination). However, Aikhionbare will present conflicting evidence "to the 
extent necessary to clarify the issues raised on appeal." Classon, 935 P.2d at 531, 
312UARat27. 
3The Okhomina's apartment is located at 717 South 200 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah (R.36). Don Okhomina, as later revealed, is legally married to a 
woman other than Evelyn (R.61-62). 
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over (R.36-38). About fifteen minutes thereafter, the door bell rang, and 
apparently the Okhominas' children opened the door for the Aikhionbares 
(R.38). Upon seeing the Aikhionbares inside the apartment, Evelyn went into 
the kitchen (R.40). At this point, Evelyn heard Margret yelling loudly and 
angrily, referring to Evelyn as a liar (R.40-42).4 Margret then came into the 
kitchen, grabbed a cooking pot and threw it against the wall (R.42). 
At this point, Evelyn told the Aikhionbares to leave the apartment 
(R.45-46). Rather than leave, Margret grabbed Evelyn's blouse, while Don 
tried to separate the two (R.46-48). Don then threatened to call the police. 
While being pinned against the wall by Margret, Evelyn broke loose, reached 
for the telephone, but had it knocked off her hands (49-50). Thereafter, 
Evelyn ran out of the apartment and attempted to call the police at a nearby 
"7-11" store (R.50). The Aikhionbares subsequently came out of the apartment 
and stood by their vehicle (R.52). As Evelyn passed by them on her way back 
from the store, Margret followed Evelyn and forced her way into Evelyn's 
4Evelyn later came to understand that Margret was referring to the time 
when Evelyn had taken her children and left Don. Don had allegedly accused the 
Aikhionbares of encouraging Evelyn to leave (R.44). 
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apartment (R.54). A fight ensued, in which Margret allegedly bit Evelyn on 
the lips, causing her mouth to bleed (R.54-55). 
2. The Trial 
At the conclusion of Evelyn's testimony, the City reserved the right 
to call rebuttal witnesses, and then rested (R.69). Margret thereafter testified, 
relating that she and her husband had been invited over to the Okhominas' 
apartment to discuss an issue relating to a domestic fight between Don and 
Evelyn (R.70-72,85). When they arrived, Margret was confronted by Evelyn, 
who pointed a spoon at her and said "don't let me use this spoon to hit you 
[and] put pepper in your eye." (R.73,90). Thereafter, Victor told his wife they 
needed to leave if Evelyn does not want to discuss the issue (R.74). At this 
point, the Aikhionbares left the apartment, and Evelyn followed them to their 
vehicle. As Margret returned to the apartment to retrieve her purse, Evelyn 
slapped her and tore buttons off her shirt (R.75-78). Evelyn ended up 
dragging Margret into the apartment, and then began chewing on her fingers. 
It was at this point that Margret chewed on Evelyn's mouth to get her hand 
released (R.79-80). 
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Victor Aikhionbare also testified for the defense. He said Don had 
called him to discuss an issue concerning an association in which both were 
members. Victor then suggested that they meet to resolve some other personal 
issues, and Don agreed (R.104). Consistent with Margret's testimony, Victor 
said they had left the apartment when his wife remembered her purse. As she 
was about to enter the apartment, Evelyn grabbed Margret's shirt, tore it open, 
and started biting her fingers (R. 105-109). 
At this point, the City called Don as a rebuttal witness, without any 
defense objection (R.130). Don testified that Victor is his childhood friend. 
He had called Victor to discuss a matter relating to the association, and Victor 
said he wanted to come over to discuss other issues. Don told Victor not to 
come to the apartment because it was too late (R. 133-134). Victor and his 
wife nonetheless came over and began yelling in profanities (R.137). 
Thereafter, Margret threw the cooking pot against the kitchen wall, and the 
fight ensued as Evelyn testified (R.142-147).5 
5The City also called as a "rebuttal" witness Salt Lake City Police Officer 
Richard Blanchard, who basically testified to what the parties told him upon 
arriving at the scene (R.166). 
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The court thereafter found Aikhionbare guilty as charged (R.193), 
and sentenced her to sixty days in jail, in addition to four hundred and fifty 
dollars in fine. The jail sentence, however, was suspended, in lieu of a one-year 
probation. See R.19. This appeal then followed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the City's use of 
rebuttal witnesses to twice present its case-in-chief. The manner in which the 
City presented its evidence deprived Aikhionbare a fair trial, for the City had 
the opportunity to evaluate Aikhionbare's evidence, regroup, and then re-
present its case to the court. Aikhionbare was prejudiced by counsel's 
performance, because the case was rather close and the manner in which the 
City presented its case unfairly tipped the balance in its favor. 
The trial court should have noticed counsel's error in not objecting 
to the manner in which the City presented its case. It should have been 
obvious to the court, with relation to plain error, that counsel's failure to object 
to the evidence was erroneous and prejudicial. 
- 1 0 -
The evidence clearly was insufficient to convict Aikhionbare, given 
that the evidence shows that the alleged victim was indeed the perpetrator of 
the assault, and that Aikhionbare acted in self-defense. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AIKHIONBARE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN COUNSEL 
FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE CITY'S USE OF 
REBUTTAL WITNESSES TO TWICE PRESENT ITS 
CASE-IN-CHIEF. 
A. Relevant Facts 
At the conclusion of the testimony of its main witness, the City 
rested its case, reserving the right to call rebuttal witnesses. See R.69. After 
the defense rested, the City announced its rebuttal witnesses. See R.130. 
Defense counsel raised no objection. See id. The rebuttal witnesses then 
testified consistently with the prosecutrix. See R. 130-147, 164-170. 
B. Standard of Review 
To successfully assert an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, a defendant must show that (i) counsel's 
performance was deficient in some demonstrable 
manner so as to fall below an objective standard of 
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reasonable professional judgment, and (ii) there is a 
reasonable probability that but for the ineffective 
assistance, the result in the proceeding would have 
been more favorable to the defendant. 
State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553,555 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).6 Whether the district 
court properly allowed rebuttal testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
See State v. Goodlijfe, 578 P.2d 1288, 1290-91 (Utah 1978). Accord United 
States v. Vivero, 413 F.2d 971, 972 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 1017, 90 S.Ct. 
583 (1970). 
C. Counsel's Performance and Prejudice to Aikhionbare 
It is axiomatic that the district court retains reasonable authority 
"over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses. . . . " Utah R. Evid. 
611(a). That authority, however, is not boundless. See Goodlijfe, 578 P.2d at 
1290-91. The court is empowered to exercise that authority "reasonably." Utah 
R. Evid. 611(a). In Goodlijfe, the State presented its sexual abuse case against 
the defendant and rested. After the defendant presented his witnesses, and 
'See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-696, 104 S. Ct. 2052 
(1984); State v. Villarreal, 889 P.2d 419, 427 (Utah 1995); Templin, 805 P.2d at 
186; Classon, 935 P.2d at 531, 312 UAR at 31; State v. Montes, 804 P.2d 543, 
545 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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over his objection, the State presented the testimony of additional witnesses in 
rebuttal. See Goodliffe, 578 P.2d at 1289-90. In reversing the defendant's 
conviction, the supreme court held that "the obvious and logical time" for the 
State to present testimony corroborating the prosecutrix "is during one's case 
in chief." Id. at 1290-91. A leading evidentiary treatise is in accord: 
Plaintiff's rebuttal and defendant's surrebuttal. The 
plaintiff... is entitled to present his case in rebuttal. 
The plaintiff/government may not at this stage present 
witnesses who merely lend support to the evidence 
originally presented as to the elements of the offense. . ., 
but is confined to testimony directed to refuting the 
defendant's evidence. The proper scope and function 
of rebuttal is thus refutation, which involves evidence 
which denies, explains, qualifies, disproves, repels or 
otherwise sheds light on evidence offered by the 
defense including evidence rehabilitating the credibility 
of witnesses. 
Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 611.3, at 515 (2d ed. 1986) (emphasis 
added). 
Here, as in Goodliffe, the City's rebuttal witnesses did not refute 
the testimony of Aikhionbare's witnesses. Rather, the rebuttal witnesses' 
testimony was cumulative, merely lending support to the prosecutrix' assertion. 
See R.130-147, 164-170. See also Goodliffe, 578 P.2d at 1290-91. In other 
words, Evelyn's testimony arguably was directed at establishing the elements 
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of the charged crime. Accordingly, Don's corroborating testimony should 
obviously have been presented at the City's case in chief, not in rebuttal. See 
Goodliffe, 578 P.2d at 1290. 
In our adversary system, it is the responsibility of defense counsel 
to object to the admission of prejudicial evidence against his client.7 Here, 
counsel failed to object to the admission of the prejudicial, "rebuttal" 
testimony. Under the Strickland standard, counsel's performance was clearly 
deficient.8 See State v. Walters, 813 P.2d 857, 867 (Idaho 1990); State v. Hallett, 
796 P.2d 701, 705 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (counsel's performance deficient in 
failing to object to admission of hearsay evidence), ajfd., 856 P.2d 1060 (Utah 
1993).9 Aikhionbare, however, is aware of this Court's long-held presumption 
nSee Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 103.9 (2d ed. 1986 & Supp. 
1996) ("Graham"); Weinstein et al., Evidence 96 (8th ed. 1988); Imwinkelried, 
Evidentiary Foundations 7, 10 (1986). 
8The ABA Standards "furnish a reliable guide for determining the 
responsibilities of defense counsel...." Marzullo v. State of Maryland, 561 F.2d 
540, 545 (4th Cir. 1977). The ABA Standard Relating to Defense Function 
provides that a lawyer should follow proper procedures, entering appropriate 
motions and objections to protect the rights of the accused. See ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice, "The Defense Function," Standard 4-3 (1979 & Supp. 1986). 
9But see State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987) (quoted case 
omitted) ('"Decisions as to what objections to make ... are generally left to the 
professional judgment of counsel'"); State v. Julian, 111 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1989) 
(same). 
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that counsel's conduct might be considered sound trial strategy even if 
counsel's action is patently unwise.10 
In Julian, the defendant contended that his counsel failed to file a 
motion in limine and to object to presentation of evidence of other wrongful 
conduct on the part of the defendant. However, after reviewing the record, the 
supreme court concluded that: 
counsel made a conscious decision to allow 
introduction of the testimony in question in order to 
demonstrate the theory that defendant's wife had 
abnormal reactions to and preoccupation with sexual 
matters, which explained a poor marital relationship, 
and led to manipulate and corrupt the children and 
cause the fabrication of their testimony. While 
counsel conceivably took a risk by allowing discussion 
of defendant's relationship with his wife, including 
their "sexual problems," defendant cannot now 
complain that the defense was ineffective because it 
was unsuccessful. 
Julian, 111 P.2d at 1064 (footnote omitted).11 
10See, e.g. State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
("[A]n ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when no conceivable legitimate 
tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions."). 
xlSee also State v. Grueber, 776 P.2d 70, 76 (Utah Ct. App.) (counsel's 
strategy of eliciting from defendant his prior convictions did not render counsel's 
performance deficient or defendant prejudiced), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 
1989). 
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The instant case, however, is clearly distinguishable from Julian and 
its progeny. Here, Aikhionbare maintained her innocence throughout the 
investigatory stages and at trial. She also denied ever assaulting Evelyn, which 
testimony was contradicted by Don. Thus, credibility before the trier of fact 
was of paramount concern because of the conflicting testimony.12 Accordingly, 
there was no trial strategy upon which counsel's failure to preclude the 
admission of the so-called rebuttal testimony could be predicated. See Emmett, 
839 P.2d at 786. 
The rebuttal testimony was unnecessary and not probative of any 
element of the charged crime. Therefore, admission of such evidence was 
clearly prejudicial to Aikhionbare,13 since it made her appear to be a 
prevaricator, and thus more inclined to commit the alleged offense. The court 
could have reached a different verdict absent the highly prejudicial evidence 
and counsel's ineffectiveness in precluding its admission.14 Consequently, 
12See State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785-86 (Utah 1992); State v. Deporto, 
935 P.2d 484, 494 (Utah 1997). 
12See State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987). 
™See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786; cf. Deporto, 935 P.2d at 494, 308 UAR at 
24 (result might have been different absent admission of inadmissible other bad 
acts). 
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Aikhionbare urges this Court to reverse her conviction and order a new trial.15 
POINT II 
THE COURT FAILED TO NOTICE THE PLAIN 
ERROR IN ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE 
DESCRIBED ABOVE, WHICH FAILURE AFFECTED 
AIKHIONBARES RIGHT. 
Utah R. Evid. 103(d) states: 
Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking 
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights 
although they were not brought to the attention of the 
court. 
"Plain error" requires that the error be obvious to the trial court and that the 
error affect the substantial rights of the accused.16 It should have been obvious 
to the trial court that the so-called rebuttal witnesses were providing merely 
cumulative evidence, which was prejudicial and inadmissible. 
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992), is instructive. In 
Emmett, the defendant was charged with sodomy upon his five-year-old son. 
On direct examination, the defendant admitted having committed a forgery in 
lsSee Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786; State v. Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 
(Utah 1989) (if the "taint" caused by inadmissible evidence is sufficient, "it is 
irrelevant that there is sufficient untainted evidence to support a verdict"). 
16 Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35; Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785; State v. Elm, 808 
P.2d 1097 (Utah 1991). 
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which the victim was his sister. In his closing argument, the prosecutor alluded 
to the forgery conviction, stating that the defendant had taken advantage of his 
sister and has now taken advantage of his son. The defendant's counsel, 
however, failed to make a timely objection to the comment. See 839 P.2d at 
785. In addition, there was conflicting testimony between the defendant and 
his wife on critical issues. Accordingly, credibility became very important. See 
id. The defendant eventually was convicted, apparently because the jury 
believed he did not testify truthfully. See id. at 786. 
On appeal, the supreme court reversed, noting first that evidence 
of a prior conviction is inadmissible under Rules 404 and 609 as substantive 
evidence of guilt. That defense counsel failed to object to the comment, the 
court continued, should not have precluded the trial court from noticing this 
obviously plain error. See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785-86. The court noticed that, 
because the case was rather close due to the circumstantial nature of the 
State's evidence, the substantive use of the prior conviction must have tilted the 
balance in favor of conviction, "particularly... where [the defendant's character 
is at the heart of his defense." Id. at 786. Accordingly, the court ordered a 
new trial. See id. at 787. 
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As previously stated, the trial court should not have allowed the City to 
twice present its case-in-chief, even though counsel raised no objection. 
Credibility was an important factor at trial, and the admission of the evidence 
tilted the balance unfavorably against Aikhionbare. See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 
786. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
CONVICT AIKHIONBARE OF ASSAULTING 
EVELYN. 
A. Standard of Review 
The district court's determination is reviewed for clear error. To 
establish error that requires a reversal, an appellant must marshall all the 
evidence supporting the challenged findings and then show that despite that 
evidence, the trier's findings are clearly lacking in support, even when viewed 
in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Pilling, 875 P.2d at 607-608; In 
re Interest ofD.W., Ill, 856 P.2d 363, 367 (Utah 1993). See generally Pena, 869 
P.2d at 936. 
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B. Aikhionbare was convicted on less than sufficient evidence 
The facts which support the district court's decision are generally 
as follows: Aikhionbare went uninvited to Evelyn's apartment. While there she 
began yelling loudly and angrily, referring to Evelyn as a liar. She went into 
the kitchen, grabbed a cooking pot and threw against the wall. Evelyn told 
Aikhionbare to leave the apartment. A fight ensued thereafter, in which 
Aikhionbare allegedly bit Evelyn on the lips, causing her mouth to bleed. 
In contrast, several facts weighed in favor of Aikhionbare: she and 
her husband had been invited over Evelyn's and Don's apartment to discuss an 
issue relating to a domestic fight between Don and Evelyn. When they arrived, 
Aikhionbare was confronted by Evelyn, who pointed a spoon at her and said 
"don't let me use this spoon to hit you [and] put pepper in your eye." At this 
point, the Aikhionbares left the apartment, and Evelyn followed them to their 
vehicle. As Aikhionbare returned to the apartment to retrieve her purse, 
Evelyn slapped her and tore off buttons off her shirt. Evelyn ended up 
dragging Aikhionbare into the apartment and began chewing on her fingers. 
It was at this point that Aikhionbare in defense chewed on Evelyn's mouth to 
get her hand released. 
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Accordingly, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
guilty verdict, the evidence the City presented clearly was insufficient to 
support the verdict. The evidence points to Evelyn as the aggressor, and 
Aikhionbare acting in self defense. Therefore, her conviction should be 
reversed as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Because the evidence was insufficient, Aikhionbare's conviction 
should be reversed, with an order to the district court mandating dismisal of 
the charge. In the alternative, counsel's failure to competently represent 
Aikhionbare's interest, as discussed above, was prejudicial, and thus requires 
that Aikhionbare be given a new trial. As an alternative ground, it was plain 
error for the trial court not to have noticed counsel's error. Accordingly, this 
Court should reverse the decision of the trial court on the ineffectiveness claim, 
and remand the case for a new trial. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Counsel certify that this matter can be disposed of on the parties' 
briefs. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of November, 
1997. 
YENGICH RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
By 
HAKEEM ISHOLA 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief, postage prepaid, this day of 
November, 1997, to Henry Sisneros, Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor, 451 
South 200 East, #125, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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ADDENDUM II 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Art. IV, § 4 UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMENDMENT I AMENDMENT VUI 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall 
not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a 
manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due pro-
cess of law and just compensation clauses.] 
1
 No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, 
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken'for public use, 
without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the 
State and district wherein the crime shall have been commit-
ted, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy 
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise 
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according 
to the rules of the common law. 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessiv 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted 
AMENDMENT IX 
[Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain right 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained 
people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are rese 
the States respectively, or to the people. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial po< 
The judicial power of the United States shall not! 
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, comma 
prosecuted against one of the United States by Cito 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign 
AMENDMENT XII 
[Election of President and Vice-President.] 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, as 
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whi 
least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same stall 
themselves; they shall name in their ballots the persofl 
for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted 
Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of i 
sons voted for as President, and of all persons voted 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each,whk 
they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to thel 
the Government of the United States, directed to the! 
dent of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall,! 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives,^ 
the certificates and the votes shall then be county 
person having the greatest number of votes for Pw 
shall be the President, if such number be a majority! 
whole number of Electors appointed; and if no perai 
such majority, then from the persons having the Ifi 
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those votetfi 
President, the House of Representatives shall choose ii 
ately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the Prej 
the votes shall' be taken by states, the representatiai 
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpo* 
consist of a member or members from two-thirds of thel 
and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to ii 
And if the House of Representatives shall not d* 
President whenever the right of choice shall devohij 
them, before the fourth day of March next following, t&J 
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the easel 
death or other constitutional disability of the President 
person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-Pre| 
shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority^  
whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person!; 
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the a 
Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum j 
purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole nui 
Senators, and a majority of the whole number I 
necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ii 
to the office of President shall be eligible to that i 
President of the United States. 
Art. I, § 9 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court 
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person 
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person 
or to the community or is likely to flee the jurisdiction of 
the court if released on bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pending appeal 
only as prescribed by law. 1988 (2nd S.S.) 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish* 
ments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines shall not 
be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be 
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated 
with unnecessary rigor. 1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve 
persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of 
no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the Legislature 
shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event 
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal 
cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-
fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. 1996 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is 
a party. 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, 
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any 
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to ad-
vance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. 
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall pre-
clude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute 
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to 
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 1994 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment — 
Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indict-
ment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by 
indictment, with or without such examination and commit-
ment. The formation of the grand jury and the powers and 
duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 1947 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden -
ance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,* 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue' 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, pa 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or'1 
be seized. v* 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the f 
speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions for 
truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if' 
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous' 
and was published with good motives, and for justifi 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have 
to determine the law and the fact. 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Excepti 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except ur 
absconding debtors. 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voti 
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or 
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise 
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote 
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations 
prescribed by law. 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Im 
contracts,] 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law imp 
obligation of contracts shall be passed. 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in 1 
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving *' 
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason 
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act
 s 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil po 
The military shall be in strict subordination to 
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be q" 
any house without the consent of the owner; nor inx 
except in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, 
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have 
convicted, shall exist within this State. 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged 
use without j ust compensation. 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]> 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any 
privilege or immunity. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed 
or deny others retained by the people. 
Sec* 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibi 
The provisions of this Constitution are ma 
prohibitory, unless by express words they are d~ 
otherwise. 
76-5-101 CRIMINAL CODE 201 
Section 
76-5-410. 
76-5-411. 
Child victim of sexual abuse as competent 
witness. 
Admissibility of out-of-court statement of child 
victim of sexual abuse. 
HIV Testing • 
Par t s 
• Sexual Offenders and Victims 
76-5-501. Definitions. 
76-5-502. Mandatory testing — Liability for costs. 
76-5-503. Voluntary testing — Victim to request — Costs 
paid by Crime Victim Reparations. 
76-5-504. Victim notification and counseling. 
PARTI 
ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES 
76-5-101. "Prisoner" denned. 
For purposes of this part "prisoner" means any person who 
is in custody of a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or 
who is confined in a jail or other penal institution or a facility 
used for confinement of delinquent juveniles operated by the 
Division of Youth Corrections regardless of whether the con-
finement is legal. 1994 
76-5-102. Assaul t . 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force 
or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c)' an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, 
that causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to 
another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the person causes 
substantial bodily injury to another. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused 
caused serious bodily injury to another. 1996 
76-5-102.3. Assault against school employees . 
(1) Any person who assaults an employee of a public or 
private school, with knowledge that the individual is an 
employee, and when the employee is acting within the scope of 
his authority as an employee, is guilty of a class A misde-
meanor. 
(2) As used in this section, "employee" includes a volunteer. 
1992 
76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer. 
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge 
that he is a peace officer, and when the peace officer is acting 
within the scope of his authority as a peace officer, is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor. 1987 
76-5-102.5. Assault by prisoner. 
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause 
bodily injury, is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 1974 
76-5-102.6. Assault on a correctional officer. 
Any prisoner who throws or otherwise propels fecal material 
or any other substance or object at a peace or correctional 
officer is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 1994 
76-5-102.7. Assault against health care provider and 
basic life support worker — Penalty. 
(1) A person who assaults a health care provider or basic 
life support worker is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person knew that the victim was a health care 
provider or basic life support worker; and 
(b) the health care provider or basic life support worker 
was performing emergency or life saving duties within tin 
scope of his authority at the time of the assault. 
(2) As used in this section: 
(a) "Basic life support worker" has the same meaninj 
as "basic life support personnel" provided in Section 
26-8-2. 
(b) "Health care provider" has the meaning as provide! 
in Section 78-14-3. iff 
76-5-103. A g g r a v a t e d assaul t . 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commit* 
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to an-
other; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation^! 
Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined is 
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felonji 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
iff 
76-5-103.5. Aggravated assau l t by prisoner. 
(1) Any prisoner, not serving a sentence for a capital felooj 
or a felony of the first degree, who commits aggravated assault 
is guilty of: 
(a) a felony of the second degree if no serious 
injury was intentionally caused; or j 
(b) a felony of the first degree if serious bodily injury; 
was intentionally caused. 
(2) Any prisoner serving a sentence for a capital felony on 
felony of the first degree who commits aggravated assault ii 
guilty of: "
 %: 
(a) a felony of the first degree if no serious bodily injury' 
was intentionally caused; or
 t\ 
(b) a capital felony if serious bodily injury was inteih^  
tionally caused. -'•" 
(3) For the purpose of this section, "serving a sentence*] 
means sentenced and committed to the custody of the Depart-^  
ment of Corrections, the sentence has not been terminated or j 
voided, and the prisoner is: < '& 
(a) not on parole; or 
(b) in custody after arrest for a parole violation, 
76-5-104. Consensual altercation no defense to homi*] 
c ide or assault if dangerous weapon used c 
participants are engaged in an ultimate fightj 
ing match.
 v i | 
In any prosecution for criminal homicide under Part 2 c 
this chapter or assault, it is no defense to the prosecution that! 
the defendant was a party to any duel, mutual combat, orj 
other consensual altercation if during the course of the duel,! 
combat, or altercation any dangerous weapon as defined la] 
Section 76-1-601 was used or if the defendant was engaged ioj 
an ultimate fighting match as defined in Section 76-9-705. 
76-5-105. Mayhem. 
[(1)1 Every person who unlawfully and intentionally d£] 
prives a human being of a member of his body, or disables orj 
renders it useless, or who cuts out or disables the tongue, puti] 
out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is guilty of mayhem,! 
(2) Mayhem is a felony of the second degree. lWJ 
76-5-106. Harassment . -fj 
(1) A person is guilty of harassment if, with intent to! 
frighten or harass another, he communicates a written orj 
recorded threat to commit any violent felony. h*m 
(2) Harassment is a class B misdemeanor. i f" 
4 11.08.060 Definitions - Crime of 
stalking - designated. 
11.08.010 Assault. 
An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled 
with a present ability, to commit a violent injury 
on the person of another. It is unlawful for any 
person to commit an assault within the limits of 
Salt Lake City. (Prior code 5 32-1-2) 
11.08.020 Battery. 
A battery is any willful and unlawful use of 
force or violence upon the person of another. It is 
unlawful for any person to commit a battery 
within the limits of the city. (Prior code § 32-1-3) 
11.08.030 Telephone Harassment. 
A» A o t^sow is guilty of teleotioAie. 
harassment if, with intent to annoy or alarm 
another, he/she: 
1. Makes a telephone call, whether or not a 
conversation ensues, without purpose of lawful 
communication, including but not limited to 
making a call or calls and then terminating the call 
before conversation ensues; or 
2. Makes repeated, unwanted telephone calls 
at extremely inconvenient hours; or 
3. Insults, taunts or challenges another by use 
of telephone communication in a manner likely to 
provoke a violent or disorderly response; or 
4. Telephones another and knowingly makes 
any false statement concerning injury, death, 
disfigurement, indecent conduct or criminal 
conduct of the person telephoned or any member 
of his/her family, or uses obscene, profane or 
threatening language with intent to terrify, 
intimidate, harass or annoy. The making of a false 
statement as herein set out shall be prima facie 
evidence of intent to terrify, intimidate, harass or 
annoy. 
B. Telephone harassment is a Class B 
misdemeanor. (Ord. 88-86 $ 60 (part), 1986: prior 
code § 32-1-19) 
11.08.040 Emergency Telephone Abuse. 
A. A person is guilty of emergency telephone 
abuse if such person: 
1. Intentionally refuses to yield or surrender 
the use of a party line or a public pay telephone to 
another person upon being informed that such 
telephone is needed to report a fire or summon 
police, medical or other aid in case of emergency, 
unless such telephone is likewise being used for 
an emergency call; or 
2. Asks for or requests the use of a party line 
or a public pay telephone on the pretext that an 
emergency exists, knowing that no emergency 
exists. 
B. Emergency telephone abuse \s a Class B 
misdemeanor. 
C. For the purposes of subsection A of this 
section: 
1. "Emergency" means a situation in which 
property or human life is in jeopardy and the 
prompt summoning of aid is essential to the 
observation of human life or property; 
2. "Party line" means a subscriber's line or 
telephone circuit consisting of two or more main 
telephone stations connected therewith, each 
station with a distinctive ring or telephone 
number. (Ord. 88-86 § 60 (part), 1986: prior code 
{32-1-20) 
11.08.050 Place Of Commission Of Offense 
Involving Use Of Telephone. 
Any offense committed by use of a telephone 
as set out in Sections 11.08.030 and 11.08.040, or 
their successors, may be deemed to have been 
committed at either the place at which the 
telephone call or calls were made, or at the place 
where the telephone call or calls were received. 
(Ord. 88-86 $ 60 (part), 1986: prior code § 
32-1-22) 
I f.08.060 Definitions - Crime Of Stalking -
Designated. 
A. Definitions. 
I. "Course of conduct" means a 
pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts 
over a period of time, however short, evidencing a 
continuity of purpose but serving no legitimate 
purpose. 
a. The course of conduct must cause a 
reasonable person to suffer severe emotional 
distress. 
I UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS. ope. rpose and construction, ihngs on evidence, eliminary questions, nited admissibility, mainder of or related writings or recorded s tatements . ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE. dicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
I I ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS. 
Presumptions in general in civil actions and proceedings. 
^Applicability of federal law in civil actions and proceed-
I ingS* 
t+ ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS. 
y. 
L Definition of "relevant evidence." 
I Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evi-
g dence inadmissible. 
L Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
| confusion, or waste of time. 
I Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; 
* exceptions; other crimes. 
b Methods of proving character. 
I Habit; routine practice. 
, Subsequent remedial measures. 
L Compromise and offers to compromise. 
I Payment of medical and similar expenses. 
I Inadmissibility of pleas, plea discussions, and related 
statements. 
, Liability insurance. 
, Admissibility of alleged victim's sexual behavior o r al-
leged sexual predisposition. 
i 
}f ARTICLE V. PRIVILEGES. 
Privileges recognized. 
Husband-wife. 
Communications to clergy. 
Lawyer-client. 
Government informer. 
Physician and mental health therapist-patient. 
Miscellaneous matters . 
Environmental self-evaluation privilege. 
ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES. 
General rule of competency. 
Lack of personal knowledge. 
Oath or affirmation. 
Interpreters. 
Competency of judge as witness. 
Competency of juror as witness. 
Who may impeach. 
Evidence of character and conduct of witness. 
Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime. 
Religious beliefs or opinions. 
Mode and order of interrogation and presentation. 
Writing used to refresh memory. 
Prior s tatements of witnesses. 
Calling and interrogation of witnesses by court. 
Exclusion of witnesses. 
ARTICLE VIII OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
RULE 
701.! Opinion testimony by lay witnesses. 
702. Testimony by experts. 
703. Bases of opinion testimony by experts. 
704. Opinion on ult imate issue. 
705. Disclosure of facts or data underlying expert opinion. 
706. Court-appointed experts. 
ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY. 
801. Definitions. 
802. Hearsay rule. 
803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immate-
rial. 
804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. 
805. Hearsay within hearsay. 
806. Attacking and supporting credibility of declarant. 
ARTICLE LX. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION. 
901. Requirement of authentication or identification. 
902. Self-authentication. 
903. Subscribing witness* testimony unnecessary. 
ARTICLE X. CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, 
RECORDINGS, AND 
PHOTOGRAPHS. 
1001. Definitions. 
1002. Requirement of original. 
1003* Admissibility of duplicates. 
1004. Admissibility of other evidence of contents. 
1005. Public records. 
1006. Summaries. 
1007. Testimony or wri t ten admission of party. 
1008. Functions of court and jury. 
ARTICLE XI. MISCELLANEOUS RULES. 
1101. Applicability of rules. 
1102. [Reserved.l 
1103. Title. 
ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
Rule 101. Scope. 
These rules govern proceedings in the courts of this State, to 
the extent and with the exceptions stated in Rule 1101. 
Rule 102. Purpose and construct ion . 
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in admin-
istration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and 
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to 
the end tha t the t ru th may be ascertained and proceedings 
justly determined. 
Rule 103. Rul ings on ev idence . 
(a) Effect of erroneous rul ing. Error may not be predi-
cated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless 
a substantial right of the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting 
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of 
record, stat ing the specific ground of objection, if the 
specific ground was not apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding 
evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known 
to the court by offer or was apparent from the context 
within which questions were asked. 
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(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any 
other or further statement which shows the character of the 
evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, 
and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in 
question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be 
conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmis-
sible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, 
such as making statements or offers of proof or asking ques-
tions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking 
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although 
they were not brought to the attention of the court. 
Rule 104. Preliminary questions. 
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary 
questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a 
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of 
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the 
provisions of Subdivision (b). In making its determination it is 
not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to 
privileges. 
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy 
of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, 
the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of 
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the 
condition. 
(c) Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility of 
confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of the hearing of 
the jury. Hearings on other preliminary matters shall be so 
conducted when the interests of justice require, or when an 
accused is a witness and so requests. 
(d) Testimony by accused. The accused does not, by 
testifying upon a preliminary matter, become subject to cross-
examination as to other issues in the case. 
(e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not limit the 
right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant 
to weight or credibility. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 105. Limited admissibility. 
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one 
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another 
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the 
evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. 
Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or f re-
corded statements. > < 
When a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is 
introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the 
introduction at that time of any other part or any other 
writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be 
considered contemporaneously with it. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of 
adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not 
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally 
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or 
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to 
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, 
whether requested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if 
requested by a party and supplied with the necessary infor-
mation. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is 
timely request to an opportunity to be h' 
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor' 
noticed. In the absence of prior notification, t 
be made after judicial notice has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice 
any stage of the proceeding. 
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or' 
court shall instruct the jury to accept as cond^  
judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the co 
the jury that it may, but is not required to, zr 
any fact judicially noticed. 
X 
ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTION 
Rule 301. Presumptions in general in civil 
proceedings. 
(a) Effect. In all civil actions and proceeding! 
provided for by statute or by these rules,'* 
imposes on the party against whom it is directed 
proving that the nonexistence of the presu 
probable than its existence. 
(b) Inconsistent presumptions. If presu 
consistent, the presumption applies that is*" 
weightier considerations of policy. If considei 
are of equal weight neither presumption app1' 
Rule 302. Applicability of federal law 
and proceedings. 
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of^  
respecting a fact which is an element of a claim 
to which federal law supplies the rule of d:: 
mined in accordance with federal law. 
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY 
AND ITS LIMITS. 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evide-
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having 
make the existence of any fact that is of or 
determination of the action more probable < 
than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally 
relevant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except* 
provided by the Constitution of the United* 
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, orbgr 
by other rules applicable in courts of this 
which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
value is substantially outweighed by the « 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading' 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time; 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404. Character evidence not adn 
conduct; exceptions; other c ' 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evid" 
character or a trait of character is not 
purpose of proving action in conformity the; 
ticular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence 
trait of character offered by an accused, 
ecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a" 
of character of the victim of the crime 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
